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COPYRIGHT AS PROPERTY IN THE POST-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY: A RESEARCH 
AGENDA 
Julie E. Cohen1 
 
I. INCENTIVES FOR AUTHORS OR INCENTIVES FOR CAPITAL? 
The statement that the purpose of copyright is to furnish incentives for 
authors has attained the status of a rote incantation. Court opinions and 
legislative histories are peppered with references to the incentives-for-authors 
rationale. Judges recite it as a matter of course when deciding cases, and 
legislators, lobbyists, and other interested parties invoke it in debates about 
proposed amendments to the copyright laws. Copyright scholars frame policy 
problems in terms of an “incentives-access” tradeoff, and that framing in turn 
affects our analysis of what judges and legislators do. Accepting the fundamental 
correctness of the incentives-for-authors rationale, we then apply our preferred 
mode of policy analysis to determine whether particular actions are consistent 
with it.   
The incentives-for-authors rationale also informs scholarly critiques of the 
copyright legislative process. Jessica Litman’s foundational work on the 
legislative history of copyright documented the ways in which the core 
legislative functions of drafting and negotiation have been captured by 
stakeholder industries.2 Litman showed that neither authors nor the public have 
been well represented in the back-room lawmaking processes that have become 
the norm. Building on that work, copyright scholars have carefully scrutinized 
the public face of copyright lawmaking, and particularly the legislative hearing 
process. Many charge that the legislative process is pervaded with hypocrisy: 
that the copyright industries invoke incentives for authors disingenuously, all 
the while advancing their own particular interests.3  
In short, scholarly and policy discourse about copyright operates on the 
baseline presumption that the author-centeredness of copyright is appropriate; 
it’s just the hypocrisy that is bad. Talking about incentives for authors is more 
palatable than asking for corporate welfare, so that’s why the copyright 
industries do it—often in laughably unsubtle ways. But those aren’t the only two 
                                                 
1 Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to William Bratton, Deven Desai, Wendy Gordon, 
Jessica Silbey, David Super, Rebecca Tushnet, Molly Van Houweling, Phil Weiser, participants in the 
University of Michigan Intellectual Property Workshop, and participants in the Wisconsin Law Review 
Symposium on Intergenerational Equity and Intellectual Property for their helpful comments, and to Jack 
Mellyn for research assistance. 
2 Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987). 
3 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61 (2002-
03); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433 (2006-07); Peter K. 
Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2003-04); Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright 
Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655 (1996).  
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alternatives.  Another is for participants in the copyright policy process to accept 
that copyright is centrally about corporate welfare—or, to be more precise, that 
copyright is about the proper industrial policy for the so-called creative 
industries—and then proceed without the hypocrisy.   
In this essay I will argue that the last alternative is the right one.  The 
incentives-for-authors formulation of copyright’s purpose is so deeply ingrained 
in our discourse and our thought processes that it is astonishingly hard to avoid 
invoking, even when one is consciously trying not to do so. (If you don’t believe 
me, try writing a paragraph about what copyright is for.4)  Yet avoiding that 
formulation is exactly what we ought to be doing.  
First, the incentives-for-authors story is wrong as a descriptive matter. 
Everything we know about creativity and creative processes suggests that 
copyright plays very little role in motivating creative work. Creative people are 
much more apt to describe what they do as the product of desire, compulsion or 
addiction, and to understand particular results as heavily influenced by cultural, 
intellectual, and emotional serendipity.5 Copyright’s role is not, and could not be, 
to trigger those processes. Creative people are happy to receive copyright 
protection for their work, and it is certainly defensible to think that we ought to 
reward them for doing it (of which more later), but copyright isn’t why they do 
the work in the first place.  
Second, the incentives-for-authors story impedes clear-eyed assessment of 
copyright’s true economic and cultural functions. In the contemporary 
information society, the purpose of copyright is to enable the provision of capital 
and organization so that creative work may be exploited. Copyright creates a 
foundation for predictability in the organization of cultural production, 
something particularly important in capital-intensive industries like film 
production, but important for many other industries as well. To be clear, I do not 
mean to say that predictability in cultural production is copyright’s ultimate 
purpose. Instead, predictability serves the instrumental function that copyright 
scholars and policymakers have (wrongly) envisioned for incentives-for-authors: 
It is a means through which copyright seeks to ensure that its ultimate purpose 
of promoting cultural progress is achieved. And the choice of copyright as a 
principal means of promoting cultural production has consequences for the 
content of culture as well. 
                                                 
4 A signal virtue of the high-level principles set forth in the recent report of the Copyright Principles 
Project is that they avoid rote incantation of the “incentives for authors” fallacy in describing how a good 
copyright law should be constructed. See Pamela Samuelson and Members of the CPP, The Copyright 
Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. ___ (2010). Even so, the drafters were 
not always able to steer clear of the incentives formulation when discussing specific reform possibilities. 
5 See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY 
PRACTICE, chs. 3-4 (Yale University Press, forthcoming 2011); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in 
Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007); Rebecca L. Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair 
Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009). 
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This reframing has four important consequences for debates about 
copyright law and policy: 
First and most critically, abandoning the incentives-for-authors story 
requires us to talk about cultural progress differently, and that is a very good 
thing indeed. In debates about copyright’s relationship to cultural progress, the 
incentives-for-authors story has functioned as a smokescreen, enabling scholars, 
judges, and legislators to conflate economic and creative motivation and 
obscuring important questions about how creative motivation arises. Severing 
the motivational link between creativity and economics requires us to come up 
with a better understanding of how cultural progress emerges, and a more 
accurate account of how the economic incentives that copyright provides (call 
them incentives-for-capital) affect progress more generally. 
Second, an account of copyright as incentives-for-capital suggests a 
different approach to conceptualizing the kind of “property” that copyright 
represents. Copyright scholars habitually compare copyright to property in land, 
a conceptual move that passes over an important stage in the evolution of 
economic activity and associated economic rights. There are important benefits 
to be gained from comparing post-industrial, information property to industrial 
property, and copyright law more explicitly to corporate law. The comparison 
requires us to think about copyright as property differently, in ways that 
foreground its function as a tool for solving resource coordination problems. 
Third, comparing copyright more explicitly to industrial property and 
legal regimes governing its use suggests some different ways of thinking and 
talking about problems of social welfare that so often bedevil regimes of 
property law. Real property law has tried to solve social welfare problems chiefly 
by limiting the scope of entitlements, and so has copyright law. Laws that 
constitute and regulate corporations, in contrast, have approached such 
problems in ways that are more explicitly regulatory and relational. 
Fourth, comparing copyright more explicitly to industrial property 
foregrounds copyright law’s potential to function as a tool for ensuring 
accountability to the authors without whom the copyright system could not 
function. Although the incentives-for-authors story purports to celebrate authors, 
it has supported a system of property rights that as a practical matter relegates 
authors to the economic and political margins of the intellectual property system. 
Although the incentives-for-capital story appears to ignore authors entirely, 
when coupled with a theory of post-industrial property it is potentially far more 
attentive to the interests of authors than the name suggests.  
 
II. COPYRIGHT AND CULTURAL PROGRESS: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 
Conventional wisdom holds that copyright protection serves an ultimate 
purpose that transcends both incentives for authors and incentives for capital. 
Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy, 2011 Wisc. L Rev. (forthcoming). 
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That purpose—copyright’s raison d’etre—is the promotion of cultural progress. 
Yet until quite recently, copyright scholars have been surprisingly uninterested 
in testing the conventional wisdom by exploring whether copyright is in fact 
producing the beneficial effects that we ascribe to it.6 The incentives-for-authors 
story, which rests on the assumption that copyright itself motivates creativity, 
reassures us that all is well. Abandoning the incentives-for-authors story in favor 
of an incentives-for-capital formulation of copyright’s immediate purpose 
requires us to think about progress differently. If copyright itself cannot be relied 
upon to generate creative motivation, we must say something about where 
creativity comes from and how it leads to “progress.” More careful attention to 
the relationship between creativity and cultural progress in turn suggests a very 
different account of copyright’s cultural role. 
Although they don’t all use the same terminology, copyright scholars 
generally describe copyright’s effects on the production of culture in two ways: 
First, copyright supplies incentives to authors (and secondarily to intermediaries) 
for cultural production. Second, by enabling the economic independence of 
culture producers, copyright disentangles cultural production from official 
censorship. Borrowing Neil Netanel’s terminology, I will refer to these two 
functions of the copyright system as the production function and the structural 
function.7 Notably, on that account of copyright’s operation, the incentive 
structure of copyright operates to remove content constraints, not to impose 
them. And the content of the “progress” that copyright facilitates is assumed, 
absent the twin evils of state censorship and patronage-based distortion, to hold 
constant.8 Assuming properly functioning copyright markets, creative works will 
succeed or fail based on their merit alone. Copyright, then, is a catalyst for rather 
than an ingredient in cultural change: It accelerates society’s progress along a 
single, inevitable, merit-based trajectory. 
Careful contemplation of our own artistic and intellectual history should 
remind us that progress is far more contingent and less linear than the standard 
copyright narrative assumes. Within the wider scholarly landscape, the 
modernist understanding of “progress” that predominates within copyright 
theory has been thoroughly rejected as both intellectually and historically 
unsound. Cultural change proceeds in directions and patterns that cannot always 
be predicted, and that cannot be explained after the fact by reference to any 
single set of neutral criteria of excellence. Artistic and intellectual practices shift, 
                                                 
6 One promising start is Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property, __ NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011). 
7 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 347-63 (1996). 
8 For good discussions of the modernist ideal of progress that animates U.S. intellectual property law and 
theory, see Michael Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFFALO INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3 
(2001); Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 
DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993). 
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sometimes unpredictably, in response to historical, economic, legal, and cultural 
stimuli.9 Culture changes, but it does not move along an inevitable path. 
Understanding how cultural change emerges requires careful attention to 
both everyday creative practice and its institutional and cultural contexts. Legal 
scholars investigating “authorship” have tended to characterize creative 
motivation as both intrinsically unknowable and essentially internal, but that 
characterization owes far more to legal theory’s precommitment to a particular 
(liberal) understanding of the self than it does to the reality of creative practice.10 
Artists may not be able to tell us why they create, but they can tell us a great deal 
about the experience of creativity as compulsion—as desire to create that has 
almost nothing to do with external motivation.11 And scholarly meditations 
about creativity’s essentially internal nature do not match the experience of 
creative practice that artists describe at all. Artists can tell us a great deal about 
the where, what, who, and how of particular creative processes: where they were 
situated in space and time, what they were seeing, reading, and hearing, who 
they were talking to, and how those contextual factors became reflected in their 
creative practice. More academic studies of creativity reinforce those accounts, 
indicating that creative outputs are heavily shaped by context.12 Creativity 
emerges at the margin between self and cultural context. Creative practice also 
has a strong connection to contextual serendipity—the chance encounter or the 
unlooked-for juxtaposition that inspires a creative response.13 
Copyright affects culturally-situated creative practice in three principal 
ways. First, it creates the conditions for more widespread access to the products 
of a common culture. This function corresponds more or less to what Netanel 
calls copyright’s production function, but that function is more accurately 
described as an intermediation function: It enables publishers, record labels, 
performing rights organizations, broadcasters, software companies, libraries, 
search engines, and other intermediaries to distribute cultural works for wider 
public consumption. Even when copyright is the primary engine of production 
(for example, in the case of big-budget motion pictures), it operates to bring 
                                                 
9 For more detailed discussion, see COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF, supra note __, ch. 4. 
10 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Personality Interests of Authors and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 116 (1998); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The 
Intrinsic Dimensions of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1951-70 (2006). On the 
significance of liberal precommitments for copyright’s model of the author, see Cohen, Configuring the 
Networked Self, supra note __, ch. 3. 
11 See Tushnet, supra note __. 
12 See TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT (1996); MIHALYI CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: 
FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996); PETER GALISON, EINSTEIN’S CLOCKS, 
POINCARE’S MAPS: EMPIRES OF TIME (2003); HOWARD GARDNER, CREATING MINDS: AN ANATOMY OF 
CREATIVITY AS SEEN THROUGH THE LIVES OF FREUD, EINSTEIN, PICASSO, STRAVINSKY, ELIOT, GRAHAM, 
AND GANDHI (1993); DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, ORIGINS OF GENIUS: DARWINIAN PERSPECTIVES ON 
CREATIVITY (1999). 
13 See COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF, supra note__, ch. 4. 
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creative contributors together and to harmonize the legal rights that apply to 
their contributions. 
The extent to which the effects of incentives for capital “trickle down” to 
authors is an important but so far unanswered question. According to the 
conventional wisdom on such matters, to the extent that “sacrificial days” 
devoted to creative endeavor are more likely to be rewarded, copyright’s 
incentive effect is real and direct.14 Certainly it seems reasonable to posit that an 
economically robust copyright system might affect the career choices of creative 
people.  I suspect, however, that very few fiction writers and visual artists 
sustain themselves purely on income from works motivated solely by creative 
desire and intellectual serendipity.15 Instead, an economically robust copyright 
system enables employment in the production of particular types of works 
produced by the culture industries. Employment as a freelance magazine writer 
or news photographer, as writer or composer of advertising materials, and so 
on—or as a creative writing or fine arts teacher at a school or college—may then 
subsidize the production of additional works motivated by creative desire. At 
any rate, the question of the precise link between incentives-for-capital and 
sacrificial days devoted to the pursuit of creative desire requires empirical study. 
Second, copyright establishes structural parameters within which the 
content of common culture develops, but copyright’s structural effects are not 
neutral. A market-based system of private production may avoid the problem of 
state censorship, but that does not translate into independence from external 
influence. Copyright’s structural function entails the privatization and 
commercialization of culture, a process that brings other types of external 
influence to the fore. In particular, the incentives for capital that copyright 
supplies support the mass culture industries and mass culture markets which in 
turn have distinct and well-studied substantive preferences and inclinations.16 
Copyright academics have tended to see works of mass culture as 
representing a lamentable but unavoidable degradation of authorial purity. As a 
result we are fond of denigrating mass culture, but we shouldn’t be. A copyright 
regime that works to enable the production of big-budget Hollywood movies 
and long-running television series is not a bad thing. Mass culture has a value 
that goes beyond the merely economic; it is what gives us things to talk about 
with one another, to celebrate or criticize, and to define ourselves against. Many 
of the examples of spontaneous bottom-up culture that copyright critics 
                                                 
14 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
15 One recent study of British and German writers found that fewer than half subsist on copyright-related 
income alone, see Martin Kretschmer & Philip Hardwick, Authors’ Earnings from Copyright and 
Noncopyright Sources: A Survey of 25,000 British and German Writers (2007), available at 
http://www.cippm.org.uk/publications/alcs/ACLS%20Full%20report.pdf. 
16 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311 (1997); Yochai 
Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
81 (2002); see also Netanel, supra note __, at 358-61. 
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(including myself) celebrate are based on mass culture. It would be hard to 
imagine, for example, fan fiction detached from its mass-culture substrate. This 
essay seeks neither to bury mass culture nor to praise it.17 My point simply is that 
copyright’s structural function—perhaps better termed its privatization function—
cannot help but affect the content and direction of “progress.” 
Third, and despite the formal content-neutrality of most copyright 
doctrines, copyright also affects the content of common culture more directly, by 
virtue of the way in which it operates to place certain inputs off limits to 
unauthorized users. To see this point, it is important to begin by recognizing that 
what contemporary cultural critics celebrate as “remix” is not simply an Internet-
era phenomenon. Creative practice is remix, and always has been. Authors are 
users first, situated in their own cultures and communities. When situated users 
become authors, their creative output doesn’t develop in a vacuum, but rather 
builds on the cultural inputs available in ways that relate to both form and 
substance.18 What has changed in the contemporary, mass-mediated information 
society is the substrate for remix culture. Today, mass culture provides much of 
the raw material for cultural experimentation and self-definition that myths, 
legends, and other public domain subject materials formerly provided.  
Here, a copyright regime that considers only incentives-for-capital creates 
a potential threat to cultural progress. The conventional account of copyright 
holds that copyright does not impede progress because it leaves access to 
essential building blocks unobstructed, but the conventional account is wrong. 
Copyright necessarily obstructs access to essential building blocks, because of the 
way creative practice works (and so I will call copyright’s third function its 
obstructive function). Although legally we say that users may draw upon the 
public domain, including both old works and unprotectable “ideas,” what 
matters most to situated users is the culture they can see and hear around 
them—works located in the immediate “cultural landscape.”19 Works of mass 
culture so often supply the raw material for new creative efforts because that is 
what users see every day. And although we in copyright world like to think of 
“ideas” and “expressions” as definitionally separate, the rest of the world knows 
it isn’t true; processes of cultural transmission don’t distinguish between the two 
so neatly.20 A healthy system of copyright must consider the inputs that authors 
require to function as authors, and can’t content itself simply with invoking 
platitudes about the separability of idea and expression or the universally-
accessible public domain. Nor can it credibly deny all “unauthorized” cultural 
creations access to popular distribution platforms. 
                                                 
17 [remix reference to be supplied by the reader] 
18 See COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF, supra note __, ch. 4. 
19 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in LUCIE 
GUIBAULT & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, EDS., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121 (2006). 
20 See Cohen, Creativity and Culture, supra note __. 
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Copyright does not itself create progress, and it promotes progress most 
effectively only when it respects all of culture’s moving parts. To fulfill its 
intermediation and privatization functions, a regime of copyright law must 
supply incentives for capital. To minimize the adverse effects of its obstructive 
function, it must approach that task in a way that takes into account the essential 
connection between cumulative creativity by situated users and larger patterns 
of cultural change. Put differently, a sensible regime of copyright must leave 
room for culture to move and grow. 
 
III. COPYRIGHT AS POST-INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY? 
Taking seriously the idea of copyright as incentives-for-capital—as a 
regime of rights designed with the immediate purpose of incentivizing the 
intermediation and privatization of culture while avoiding cultural obstruction—
suggests a new perspective on another heated debate among copyright scholars, 
this one having to do with whether copyright is or isn’t “property.” I do not 
intend to take sides in that debate, but rather to suggest that its premises flow 
from an unduly constrained understanding of what “property” is or might be. If 
copyright is property, it is post-industrial property: property that performs a 
different set of social and economic functions than the property in land to which 
it is so often compared. 
The idea of “property” casts a long shadow within copyright law. 
Copyright expansionists have long argued that “property” supplies an 
appropriate and economically efficient template for copyright.21 Conversely, 
copyright critics have seen property talk about copyright as the root of 
copyright’s recent expansion.22 Still more recently, a handful of copyright 
scholars has argued that the property analogy in fact supports a properly 
restrictive definition of copyright scope.23 Whatever their views about the 
normative and descriptive consequences of property talk about copyright, 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property - A Classical Liberal Response to 
a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2009-10); Richard Epstein, Liberty versus Property - Cracks 
in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005); Frank Easterbrook, Intellectual 
Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 108 (1990); Frank Easterbrook, Cyberspace versus 
Property Law, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 103 (1999-2000); Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: 
Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000). 
22 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 
(2005); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
129 (2004); Stewart Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connections between Land and 
Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2005); see also David McGowan, Trespass Trouble and the Metaphor 
Muddle, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 109 (2005); Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of 
Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993 (2005-2006) 
23 See, e.g., Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything and the Many 
Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (2007); Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property 
Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004); Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in 
Property and Copyright, George Mason University Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-51, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688585 . 
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however, copyright scholars are in remarkable agreement about property talk’s 
universe of conceptual referents. All have pursued explanations for copyright’s 
property-ness or lack thereof in the core common law realms of property, 
contract, and tort. In other words, we have chosen to think about copyright using 
the doctrinal tools of the pre-industrial property system.  
The land-centered nature of property theory about intellectual property 
ignores a crucial stage in property’s history. The information age economy in 
which we live didn’t emerge directly from the pre-industrial economy of 
property in land.  Industrial property—corporate property—came in between.24 
The pre-industrial property system couldn’t respond to the needs of the 
industrial age, so first practice and then the law evolved. Corporate lawyers 
developed techniques for aggregating assets under fictional ownership. Fictional 
ownership alone was not enough to allow effective management of corporate 
assets, however, and so innovations in function followed innovations in form. 
Corporate law—the law of industrial property—developed formal means for 
separating ownership from control so things could get done, and rules about 
governance to ensure that management of commonly owned property remained 
accountable to other stakeholders.25 
Property thinking about copyright largely ignores these developments 
because property theory largely ignores them. Property theory is 
overwhelmingly land-centered, and has remained so despite a steady stream of 
challenges to that conceptual hegemony. The study of property rights in natural 
resources has blossomed precisely to the extent that it has gradually become 
detached from property rights in land, yet property theory persists in treating 
property rights in natural resources as variations on the primary theme.26 Chattel 
property, with its unruly connections to personhood, has figured in property 
theory primarily as a source of conceptual disruption.27 Intellectual property 
makes the occasional cameo appearance within works of mainstream property 
                                                 
24 By this I do not mean to suggest that corporate law is “older” than copyright law in an absolute historical 
sense. As copyright scholars are surely aware, modern copyright law evolved before the modern 
corporation did. Instead, the argument is that we can regard both corporate law and copyright law as 
regulatory schemes that required a baseline level of economic development to mature. Corporate law came 
into full flower once the basic principles of industrial manufacture had emerged, and the Industrial 
Revolution was well underway. In similar fashion, copyright has come into its own as a mode of facilitating 
cultural production in the era of the information economy. 
25 See ADOLPH BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); 
John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); William 
W. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1482-98 (1989); see also MARK J. ROE, THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 
5-8 (1996). 
26 For a conceptual overview of a theory of property rights in natural resources, see Daniel Cole & Elinor 
Ostrom, The Variety of Property Systems and Rights in Natural Resources: An Introduction, version of 
Aug. 3, 2010, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656418 .  
27 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
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theory, but always as a special case.28 Industrial property is rarely to be found at 
all, with the exception of one speculative work by Bell and Parchomovsky which 
notes the innovation of fictional ownership but does not proceed to consider 
ensuing innovations in property governance.29 
As an alternative to this conceptual model of the property universe, I want 
to suggest that the question “what is property?” has multiple answers that in 
turn map to multiple organizing paradigms. The answers are bound up with 
structural and cultural differences among categories of economic resources.  
Property theory about copyright ought to understand copyright—and, by 
extension, other forms of information property—as a legal institution that 
performs a particular set of economic functions related to the management of a 
particular type of resource. Specifically, copyright law in the post-industrial era 
works to separate authorship from control of creative works so that a set of 
coordination and governance problems closely associated with information 
resources can be solved. Along with the patent laws, the trademark and unfair 
competition laws, and various laws governing ownership of trade secrets, Title 
17 of the U.S. Code functions as the Delaware law of the post-industrial property 
system. 
Here one terminological clarification and one caveat are in order. By 
“post-industrial” I do not mean either “industrially owned” or “coming after the 
era of industrial dominance of culture.” As a descriptive matter neither meaning 
would be accurate. Much intellectual property is industrially owned, but much is 
not; a property regime for expressive works must supply rules for both. And 
though some scholars have heralded the death of the copyright industries, so far 
those obituaries are premature.30 Certainly a property regime for expressive 
works cannot begin by presuming the inevitable absence of a large and powerful 
set of economic and institutional actors. Instead I adopt the meaning used by 
sociologist Daniel Bell, who coined the term to refer to a moment of economic 
transition away from an economy based principally on manufacturing to one 
based primarily on the production of information and the delivery of services.31 
In such an economy, the “industrial property” model first developed in the 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1047, 1068-70 (2008); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 
YALE L.J. 1163, 1174-75 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the 
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 19-10 (2000); see also Richard A. 
Epstein, What Is So Special About Intangible Property? The Case for Intelligent Carryovers, NYU Law & 
Economics Research Paper No. 10-49, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1659999 (rejecting the idea that intellectual 
property might be different). For glimmerings of a resource-specific approach, see Henry E. Smith, Toward 
an Economic Theory of Property in Information, in KENNETH AYOTTE & HENRY E. SMITH, EDS., RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, ch. 5 (Edward Elgar, 2011).  
29 Bell & Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, supra note __, at 1044-46. 
30 See, e.g., Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951 
(2004). 
31 DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING (1973). 
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context of manufacturing is itself redirected toward ownership of service-
delivery enterprises. In addition, the rules governing property rights in 
information (including expressive works) assume new importance, and the need 
for a conceptually distinct theory of post-industrial property becomes more 
acute. 
As for the caveat, my claim is not that copyright functions or ought to 
function exactly the way industrial property does. Quite the contrary. The 
industrial property analogy’s imperfections are exactly what make it interesting. 
Both the areas of fit and the gaps in fit expose the conceptual poverty of a unitary 
model of “property.” They suggest important questions for future thinking about 
exactly what kind of property regime intangible information resources require.  
The remainder of this essay is intended to sketch a research agenda 
directed toward three large sets of questions about the function and optimal 
contours of a regime of post-industrial property, with particular reference to 
copyright. My excavation of each set of questions is preliminary in nature. I want 
simply to provoke some much-needed reflection on why we have been content to 
assume that property in land supplies the best template for resolving them. 
 
IV. POST-INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND RESOURCE COORDINATION PROBLEMS 
The first set of questions that a theory of post-industrial property needs to 
answer involves the nature of post-industrial resource coordination problems.  
Within intellectual property discourse, the unit of analysis is generally the 
individual work or invention. Any serious student of copyright law rapidly 
comes to realize, though, that as a practical matter copyright’s project is 
increasingly that of setting parameters to govern access to and use of large 
numbers of works. 
Consider some of the problems that a well-functioning modern copyright 
system needs to address: It must provide a framework within which authors and 
intermediaries can come together to negotiate the terms of production and 
distribution agreements. It must provide a framework for the licensing of 
already-published works as inputs into various kinds of activities, some 
consumptive (e.g., classroom photocopying, Internet radio, online search) and 
others additive (e.g., sound recording, filmmaking, multimedia production). It 
must provide a set of rules for aggregating contributions to large and complex 
works such as motion pictures and computer programs. 
In each of these cases, copyright is valuable not (only) because it is 
individual and atomistic (to borrow Molly Van Houweling’s terminology) but 
also because it facilitates combination and coordination.32 Notably, some 
copyright coordination problems resemble the coordination problems that 
                                                 
32 Molly Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549 (2010). 
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corporate law must address, but others are different. The relationship between 
coordination and control is also different. Within the system of industrial 
property, the separation of ownership from control is achieved once assets are 
transferred to the corporation. Within the copyright system there are multiple 
layers of control to be taken into account. Some exist because authors hold 
residual rights, while others exist by virtue of the copyright’s transfer to a new 
owner. Downstream coordination problems arise because many cultural 
activities require multiple inputs, because of the various network effects that 
cultural works create, and because of copyright’s obstructive function (described 
in Part II, above). 
Explorations of these problems from an economic perspective have 
seemed to approach the problem with a particular entitlement structure in mind, 
arguing that copyright needs to be “property” for this or that set of market 
clearing transactions to emerge in optimal fashion. If we eliminate the 
assumption of a unitary property paradigm, it becomes apparent that such an 
analysis begs important questions about the exact entitlement structure that is 
most appropriate for this resource. This is, in some ways, the point of important 
work developing the economic proof of concept for the “distributed peer 
production” paradigm as a third modality of production existing alongside 
markets and firms.33 But much work exists to be done in exploring the full range 
of activities that copyright facilitates. 
Also notably, the coordination problems confronting a regime of post-
industrial property do not solely concern how the metes and bounds of 
intangible property are to be defined. They are first and foremost governance 
problems: problems that require considering and adjusting the interests of 
multiple groups of stakeholders. Occasional strands in the copyright literature 
approach this point from a more explicitly regulatory stance.34 My argument is 
more general and concerns the ways in which entitlement structures are 
themselves governance structures, embodying choices about ownership, control, 
and institutional design. Parts V and VI consider the some of the governance 
questions surrounding post-industrial property in greater detail. 
The description of copyright as a modality for post-industrial resource 
coordination appears to pull copyright policy even more deeply into the realm of 
instrumentalism and to divorce it even farther from the personal interests of 
authors. The temptation, then, is to think that a Continental, authors’ rights 
theory of intellectual property should find the industrial property analogy 
deeply problematic. Here it is worth noting the prevalence of “neighboring 
                                                 
33 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS 
AND FREEDOM 91-127 (2006); cf. Smith, Toward an Economic Theory, supra note __ (outlining a theory of 
intellectual property based on “modularity” and information costs). 
34 See Tim Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279 (2004) (arguing that 
copyright incorporates both an “authorship” regime and a “communications” regime that functions to 
“regulat[e] competition among rival disseminators”).  
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rights” laws in Continental authors’ rights regimes. Neighboring rights laws 
respond to the reality of capital-intensive creative industries by enabling those 
industries to acquire the rights they need to plan and sustain their operations; 
typical examples include rights for broadcasters and sound recording 
producers.35 How to think about the role of neighboring rights within the 
political economy of a system of authors’ rights is a question of considerable 
importance. One may choose to view those regimes as doling out “lesser” rights; 
neighboring rights last for shorter terms and are far more limited scope. 
Alternatively, one can focus on the importance of the rights conveyed within the 
political economy of information production and distribution. If one takes the 
latter perspective, it becomes easier to understand authors’ rights regimes as 
concerned to a very real extent with coordination problems, whether or not they 
admit it. 
More generally, the existence of complex regimes of neighboring rights in 
authors’ rights regimes reinforces the notion that a regime of copyright/authors’ 
rights does not concern solely the rights of authors or of intermediaries, but 
rather the nature of the relationship between authors and intermediaries. That 
view returns us to an understanding of copyright as a distinct, post-industrial 
modality of property governance. 
 
V. POST-INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND SOCIAL WELFARE PROBLEMS 
Another benefit of framing copyright as post-industrial property concerns 
its approach to the broader set of social welfare concerns associated with any 
property regime. Property scholars often frame debates about the social welfare 
costs of property regimes through the lens of intergenerational justice. As Peggy 
Radin explains in an article in this volume, this is a function of property’s 
longevity. Many types of property outlive their initial owners, and this creates 
concerns both about whether resources will used productively for the future, and 
about whether control by past owners is just.36 The industrial property analogy 
doesn’t solve social welfare problems for us; such problems have created thorny 
difficulties for modern corporate law and practice. But laws that regulate 
corporations have confronted questions about property and social justice—
whether inter- or intra-generational—differently than “property law” has. In 
particular, within the industrial property framework, social welfare problems are 
approached in ways that are both relational and regulatory. The analogy 
therefore introduces a new perspective that might productively inform our 
thinking about the socially optimal contours of post-industrial property. 
                                                 
35 For good general summaries, see 2 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 
AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 1205-86 (2d ed. 2006); Herman 
Cohen Jehoram, The Nature of Neighboring Rights of Performing Artists, Phonogram Producers and 
Broadcasting Organizations, 15 COLUM.-V.L.A. J.L. & ARTS 75 (1990). 
36 Margaret Jane Radin, [WLR staff add cite], 2011 WISC. L. REV. ___ (2011). 
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It is useful to begin by identifying two distinct aspects of the social welfare 
problem, each of which has commanded the attention of property scholars. The 
first concerns how good stewardship of property is best achieved. The 
prevailing, Demsetzian narrative about property rights and economic efficiency 
addresses the stewardship problem; it posits that individual property rights will 
produce efficient stewardship of property over the long run.37 The law of real 
property chiefly concurs in this assessment, and so has focused principally on 
cabining restraints on alienation that might interfere with the market’s ability to 
perform its corrective function.38 It provides a more direct point of entry for the 
stewardship inquiry chiefly through the law of nuisance, which concerns the 
relative values that ought to attach to competing uses. 
The second distinct aspect of the social welfare problem concerns 
distributive justice. The Demsetzian narrative doesn’t address this problem at 
all—or, put differently, it treats stewardship problems and distributive justice 
problems as definitionally separate. Here again, the law of real property concurs, 
for the most part. The system of estates in land initially supported landed 
dynasties, but as individual ownership came into favor, the rules changed to 
enable a more neutral stance predicated on fee simple ownership and market 
alienability. Courts developed doctrinal means of disfavoring landed dynasties, 
but those doctrines have waxed and waned in importance over time, and many 
jurisdictions allow dynasty trusts, which enable wealth accumulation without 
restricting alienability. 
Following the general pattern established by real property law, copyright 
law has sought to address the stewardship problem chiefly by fostering 
alienability; copyrights are fully divisible and transferable in whole or in part. 
Copyright has addressed the distributive justice problem chiefly by setting limits 
on entitlements. Copyrights are limited in duration, and the copyright system 
also limits the scope of entitlements through the idea-expression distinction and 
analogous doctrines, which privilege certain kinds of competing uses more 
decisively than nuisance law does. As before, the general commonality in 
approaches between copyright law and real property law ignores the question 
whether changes in the forms of wealth require corresponding changes in the 
dominant modalities of property governance. 
Regimes of industrial property have confronted both the stewardship 
problem and the distributive justice problem, and have approached those 
problems differently than either of the other two regimes. In a backhanded salute 
to the legal realists’ insight that property rights are interpersonal rights, 
industrial property’s responses to the stewardship problem have emphasized its 
                                                 
37 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. REV. ECON. 347 (1967). 
38 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES), ch. 3 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS, ch. 4 (1983). 
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relational nature.39 Because the legal institution of industrial property disperses 
ownership interests, good stewardship of industrial property requires 
mechanisms for accountability. Within the framework of corporate law, 
accountability has been pursued chiefly via governance mechanisms that, at least 
in theory, are supposed to make managers more accountable to shareholders.40 
Over time society has come to realize that good stewardship of industrial 
property also requires good stewardship of human capital—of the people whose 
labor is needed to build and tend industrial capital. Within the industrial 
property paradigm, stewardship of human capital has taken the form of 
externally-imposed wage and working-hour regulation and a variety of fair labor 
practice mandates.41  
Responses to the distributive justice problem tend to be overtly regulatory 
and located outside the framework of corporate law proper: in the antitrust laws, 
which regulate the acquisition and use of market power, in the securities laws, 
which attempt to limit insiders’ ability to profit from their privileged position, 
and in various bodies of law governing marketplace disclosures, which limit 
firms’ ability to profit based on differentials in information costs.42 For the most 
part, each of these frameworks assigns ultimate regulatory authority to markets; 
however, each sanctions structural correctives for marketplace distortions.  
In recent decades, approaches to the stewardship and distributive justice 
problems that regulate at the margins of markets have confronted a more 
fundamental objection. We have come to appreciate that capital markets have 
difficulty valuing and accounting for certain kinds of external harms that 
corporate conduct creates (and, via limited liability, facilitates), such as 
environmental harms, health risks, and risks to global financial markets. These 
harms are real and documented, but our market metrics have not kept pace with 
them. The corporate social responsibility movement seeks to hold industrial 
property as an institution accountable for the collective harms and risks it 
creates. It has done so by pursuing a variety of strategies, including the creation 
                                                 
39 See Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 
(1923); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). 
40 See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990). 
41 See e.g. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (setting standards for occupational safety and health); 29 U.S.C. §§ 
201-219 (Fair Labor Standards Act, concerning wages and hours); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Civil Rights Act of 
1964, banning certain types of workplace discrimination); 29 U.S.C. § 151 (National Labor Relations Act, 
protecting the right of workers to organize into unions). 
42 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (Sherman Act, banning anticompetitive collusion and monopolization); 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 41-58 (Federal Trade Commission Act, granting authority to proscribe unfair or deceptive trade 
practices); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 et seq. (Securities Act of 1933, prohibiting misrepresentations and fraud in the 
sale of securities); 21 U.S.C. §§ 341 et seq. (Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, establishing labeling and 
disclosure mandates for consumer products). 
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of social responsibility metrics both external to and internal to conventional 
accounting procedures.43 
The emerging regime of post-industrial property also confronts problems 
of cultural stewardship and distributive justice as they relate to the broader 
claims of publics both present and future. Many scholars have argued that 
copyright’s traditional methods of dividing entitlements between copyright 
owners and the public do not entirely suffice to protect the public’s claims to 
access and enjoy common culture. Copyright’s defenders have argued that 
industrial property’s system of protections—antitrust, consumer protection, and 
so forth—provides an adequate backstop. Copyright critics have countered that 
the goals of antitrust and consumer protection law—price competition and 
informed choice, respectively—do not always map straightforwardly to the 
intellectual property system’s dominant concern with innovation, and more 
specifically do not take account of copyright’s obstructive function and its 
distributive implications. A theory of post-industrial property might enable a 
more rigorous treatment of the ways in which the various regimes (do or should) 
diverge; arguably, there is no reason to expect that regimes of antitrust and 
consumer protection law developed in the context of industrial property 
governance would supply the best answers to distributive justice problems that 
arise in the context of post-industrial property governance. 
Post-industrial property also has generated a version of the corporate 
social responsibility critique, manifested most sharply in the form of open access 
movements that encourage voluntarily assumed limitations on entitlements. 
Some scholars appear to think that access movements organized around 
licensing, such as the open source software movement and creative commons, 
themselves constitute a fully viable solution to the governance problems in 
creative industries. Arguably, the open licenses have not yet proven capable of 
solving the full range of coordination problems that expressive works present.44 
Increasingly, however, such movements are understood—and ought to be—as 
posing a fundamental challenge to a regime of property governance predicated 
on relatively thick entitlements and relatively thin public access privileges.45 A 
theory of post-industrial property might provide a framework for unifying the 
concerns that the access movements raise. 
 
 
                                                 
43 See Chip Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J. 
LAW & POL’Y (2009). 
44 See Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a 
Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2005); see also Van Houweling, supra note __, at 634-36. 
45 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual 
Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008); Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins and Access: The Future 
of Intellectual Property Law, 61 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 195 (2011). 
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VI. AUTHORS AS STAKEHOLDERS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
Consider, finally, the problem of the relationship between “authors” and 
intermediaries. Copyright theory does not often interrogate that relationship 
directly. The omission flows from the interaction between the incentives-for-
authors story, which posits that copyright itself is the reward for creative labor, 
and the pre-industrial property model, which presumes an atomistic, 
transaction-by-transaction approach to property governance. As we have just 
seen, though, the governance problems associated with copyright often are more 
complicated than the atomistic model assumes, especially in the context of the 
large-scale coordination problems already discussed. The industrial property 
analogy opens the way for a different discussion about how authors ought to be 
treated, because it suggests the possibility of formalizing relationships between 
and among multiple stakeholder classes. 
The copyright industries don’t simply transpose the coordination and 
governance problems associated with industrial (corporate) property into the 
post-industrial realm. Instead they complicate those problems by introducing a 
third class of stakeholders. Two important classes of industrial era 
stakeholders—shareholders and workers—remain squarely in the picture. 
Authors represent a third class of stakeholders that sometimes overlaps with the 
other two. Authors can be employees, and sometimes also can perform a role 
analogous to the shareholder’s role, as is the case for some collective rights 
organizations. But authors also supply a distinct type of input about which we 
have some different intuitions that a theory of post-industrial property ought to 
explore. 
Here the potential for greater convergence between Continental authors’ 
rights systems and Anglo-American copyright systems becomes apparent. 
Relational considerations have received greater emphasis within authors’ rights 
regimes; for example, such regimes traditionally have protected authors of 
literary works more comprehensively in licensing situations by establishing 
default rules disfavoring practices requiring the transfer of all rights. Yet both 
legal cultures express recognition of the distinctive value of individual creative 
contributions. Although the rhetoric about authors in U.S. legal debates about 
copyright often seems disingenuous, few would support a legal regime that gave 
no weight whatsoever to individual authorship. The origin of the authorial claim 
to social recognition and reward is an interesting question for moral 
philosophers and cultural theorists to debate. Whether the authorial claim is 
inherent in the nature of things or culturally determined, however, we value the 
contributions that creative people make.  
The more pressing question for contemporary law and policy, which 
neither copyright systems nor authors’ rights systems have confronted 
effectively, is how authorial interests ought to be recognized and protected 
within a post-industrial property system organized around resource 
coordination. The American mistake lies in assuming that what we refer to (often 
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disparagingly) as the “moral rights” of authors must be propertized according to 
the real property paradigm rather than viewed through a relational lens in order 
to be given meaningful protection. Arguably, the Continental mistake lies in 
assuming that the rights of authors must follow a personality-centered (chattel) 
property paradigm. 
If the artist-intermediary relationship is reconceptualized as a variation on 
the more general relationship between shareholders and managers, new 
questions about that relationship suggest themselves. Just as corporate managers 
are prone to favoring their own interests over those of the true owners (the 
shareholders), so we might posit that the intermediary copyright industries are 
prone to favoring their own interests over those of authors, and that this 
tendency requires appropriate structural correction. Foregrounding the agency 
problems of corporations, rather than the common law of contract, might allow 
us to think about the artist-intermediary relationship differently and more 
productively in the context of the new governance institutions that have been 
emerging for mediating access to creative works.46 
The comparison between authors and shareholders has particular force in 
those areas where the connection between authors and governance is most 
direct. In this context it’s worth noting that antitrust law has recognized the 
problem even if copyright has not; the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees exist 
partly to address governance questions.47 Governance questions also figure 
importantly in discussions about licensing regimes for orphan works, and in 
discussions about the proposed settlement in the Google Book Search lawsuit.48 
The industrial property paradigm does not provide clear guidance on how to 
address the problems of governance within a divided-ownership framework, but 
it does supply some interesting tools with which to investigate those questions.49  
Alternatively, the author-intermediary relationship can be 
reconceptualized in as a variation on the relationship between employees and 
employers. This comparison allows us to examine the ways in which the 
                                                 
46 For a suggestion in a similar vein, see Van Houweling, supra note __, at 637-38. 
47 See U.S. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10449, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 71,941 
(S.D.N.Y 1966), modified by 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 71,378 
(S.D.N.Y.1994) (the "BMI Consent Decree") (governing contract terms between authors and the rights 
agency); see also U.S. v. ASCAP, 1940-43 Trade Cas. para. 56,104 (S.D.N.Y.1941) (the “ASCAP Consent 
Decree”). 
48 See Authors Guild Inc. v. Google, Amended Settlement Agreement, Case No. 05 CV 8136-DC 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (proposed settlement, pending court approval); Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search 
and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1308 (2010); James Grimmelmann, The 
Elephantine Google Books Settlement, __ BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming 2011); Bernard Lang, 
Orphan Works and the Google Book Search Settlement: An International Perspective, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 111 (2010); Matthew Sag, The Google Books Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual, 55 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 19 (2010). 
49 For a sampling, see the articles including in Symposium: In Berle’s Footsteps – A Symposium 
Celebrating the Launch of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society, 33 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 777 (2010). 
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copyright regime provides, or fails to provide, for good stewardship of its 
human capital. Copyright scholars in the U.S. generally have been content to say 
relatively little about the terms of the contracting relationships in the creative 
industries, or about potential disparities in bargaining power between authors 
and intermediaries. For authors who are also employees, and whose outputs 
therefore qualify as works made for hire, we rely on background principles of 
labor and employment law to govern bargaining. Freelance authors are thought 
to be protected by their ability to bargain in the marketplace, and once again this 
attitude flows largely from preconceptions about the kind of property that 
copyright is.50 But property frames have policy consequences. For example, if we 
think that termination of transfers is the best way to put authors in a good 
bargaining position with respect to what is, in some transcendent sense, 
rightfully “theirs,” we may concentrate our energies on reforming termination of 
transfers rather than engaging in substantive regulation of labor contracts in the 
creative industries. If we think that copyright stimulates corporate cultural 
production principally by attributing “authorship” to employers, we may 
overlook the role that attribution practices play within creative workplaces.51 
Perhaps, however, the relative disinterest in bargaining between authors 
and intermediaries is a mistake, and perhaps the paradigm of industrial property 
has something to teach us here as well. The Industrial Revolution has figured in 
copyright theory principally as a way of describing the relationship between 
copyright owners and the public, via an analogy to the enclosure and 
appropriation of common property.52 But the Industrial Revolution also 
reshaped the relationship between capital and labor, entities that before had 
existed in ways largely separate from each other. In particular, it worked a 
partial displacement not only of agricultural workers from the land, but also of 
skilled craftsmen from their trades. It involved both the enclosure of land and the 
relocation and deskilling of labor.53  
Has the postindustrial revolution worked a comparable deskilling of 
creative labor? The answer is unclear. The culture industries require a continual 
supply of creative labor to thrive, and there is reason to think that deskilling is 
more difficult, for example, in the case of animated movie production than it 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) (“[I]t hardly follows from today’s 
decision [holding that collective work publishers improperly included individual contributions in electronic 
databases] that an injunction . . . must issue . . . . The parties (Authors and Publishers) may enter into an 
agreement allowing continued electronic reproduction of the Authors’ works . . . .”). 
51 See Catherine Fisk, The Modern Author on Madison Avenue, in PAUL SAINT-AMOUR, ED., MODERNISM 
AND COPYRIGHT 173 (2010). 
52 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure 
of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and 
the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003). 
53 See J.M. NEESON, COMMONERS: COMMON RIGHT, ENCLOSURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND, 1700-
1820 (1993); E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1963); J.D. CHAMBERS & 
G.E. MINGAY, THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1880 (1970). 
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would be in the case of dining room furniture production. Questions remain, 
however, about the extent to which current transactional frameworks have the 
effect of alienating individual creative workers from their own work product 
(bringing copyright’s obstructive function to the fore), and about the extent to 
which the background regimes of labor and employment law afford adequate 
protection for those workers given the particular considerations that attend the 
production of post-industrial property. Debates about the appropriate scope of 
noncompete covenants for high-level employees in the technology industries are 
about exactly this question.54 Outside the high technology industries, such 
debates take the form of litigation over ownership of literary characters, musical 
themes, and the like, and are framed as questions about copyright scope rather 
than as questions about labor relations in the post-industrial realm.55 But perhaps 
these disputes might benefit from reframing, and from resolution using a 
relational lens. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION: BETTER LIVING THROUGH CYNICISM? 
One premise of this essay has been that getting beyond the charming but 
inaccurate notion of copyright as an author-centered system might actually 
improve it. The reader might be forgiven for wondering whether this is actually 
true. Politically speaking, the corporate law analogy does not inspire great 
optimism. At minimum, it suggests that meaningful reforms in the governance of 
valuable resources will always lag well behind implementation of the initial 
coordination mechanism, and may be doomed to remain perpetually a work in 
progress. Even so, however, clearing away the rhetorical kudzu generated by the 
incentives-for-authors story serves valuable purposes. 
First, the idea of industrial property and by extension post-industrial 
property underscores the perversity of the Demsetzian narrative about the 
natural and ineluctable evolution of property rights.56 While the corporate form 
                                                 
54 See Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, 
Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999); Catherine Fisk, Working 
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Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2000-2001); see also Edwards v. Arthur Anderson LLP, 189 
P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008) (holding non-compete agreements to be illegal restraints of trade unless covered by a 
specific statutory exception). 
55 See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994); Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art 
Exchange, 575 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1978); Warner Bros. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), 
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introduced undeniable efficiencies into the law of industrial property, so far as I 
am aware it has not inspired its admirers to offer Demsetzian accounts of its 
inevitable emergence. To the contrary, the industrial property analogy makes 
more transparent the extent to which ownership and governance regimes are 
inextricably intertwined and socially constructed. 
Second and relatedly, the idea of industrial property and by extension 
post-industrial property reminds us that different regimes of property 
governance may require different structural safeguards to ensure the optimal 
stewardship and distribution of particular resources. Detaching copyright from 
the conceptual baseline of common law property rights, granted to but then 
bargained away from authors, is a useful exercise if it provokes more careful 
examination of questions about institutional design and optimization. Because of 
the complex role that incentives-for-capital play within our cultural ecology, and 
because of the diversity of stakeholders within a regime of cultural property, the 
legal institution of copyright requires thoughtful tailoring. 
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